The Hacker News · Aug 8
Atlassian's Rovo AI can be tricked into quietly exfiltrating a client's Jira and Confluence data
Researchers at PromptArmor showed Atlassian's Rovo AI agent can be hit with a zero-click indirect prompt injection: a hidden instruction inside an uploaded document makes Rovo collect Jira tickets and Confluence pages the signed-in user can reach and append them to an attacker-controlled URL. Disabling org-wide web search does not stop it, because Rovo keeps a separate URL-retrieval capability. The content-borne path was reported to Atlassian in May and remained unresolved at publication. Varonis separately disclosed a one-click variant that Atlassian patched server-side on July 8. Neither issue carries a CVE.
▸ The MSP Angle
Can the AI built into my clients' Jira and Confluence leak their data?
Yes, and the obvious fix does not work: turning off web search leaves the exfiltration path open because Rovo pulls data through a different tool. Jira and Confluence sit in a huge share of client stacks, so treat any built-in SaaS AI agent as a data-egress risk, not a convenience feature. Scope Rovo access by app and user group rather than leaving it broad, warn clients that an uploaded file can carry hidden instructions, and put vendor AI agents on the same review list as any new integration that can read customer data. The absence of a CVE means nobody is going to page you about this, so it is on you to raise it first.